

■ *New York Times Co. v. United States*

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Author: U.S. Supreme Court

Genre: court opinion

Summary Overview

New York Times v. United States, often called the “Pentagon Papers Case,” is a significant liberal milestone. The Supreme Court ruled that the government could not prevent the *New York Times* and other newspapers from publishing classified documents about the Vietnam War without proving a direct, immediate threat to national security.

The landmark case raised questions about the free press in America—specifically, a newspaper’s right to publish secret government documents (the Pentagon Papers) offered to it by a third party. The *New York Times* had received the papers from Daniel Ellsberg, a disaffected defense consultant, in early spring 1971. Ellsberg had illegally obtained the forty-seven volumes of classified documents, which revealed the government’s actions over twenty years in Vietnam. The *New York Times* and other newspapers began running stories based on these leaked documents on June 13, 1971, and the Nixon administration obtained an injunction to stop the *Times* from doing so. (The other papers were not so enjoined). On June 30, in a 6–3 ruling, the Supreme Court lifted the injunction and reaffirmed the principles of freedom of the press outlined in the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.

The irony is that the Pentagon Papers contained nothing about the Nixon administration or its actions in Vietnam; the report restricted itself to prior administrations. Nixon was at first inclined not to get involved in the matter, but some of his advisors, including National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger, convinced him that the release of the Pentagon Papers posed a serious threat to national security and could undermine the administration’s own operations in Indochina. Kissinger dubbed Ellsberg “the most dangerous man in America,” and Nixon soon adopted the same attitude toward the leaker.

Defining Moment

In 1967, the United States was embroiled in ground combat in South Vietnam, and public sentiment against the war was growing. Hoping to document the decision-making process that led the country into this conflict, U.S. secretary of defense Robert McNamara directed that a history of the nation’s involvement in Vietnam be compiled from classified and unclassified papers dating back to the Harry S. Truman administration. The forty-seven volume study, *United States-Vietnam Relations, 1945–1967: A Study Prepared by the Department of Defense*, was classified top secret, and only a handful of copies were reproduced.

In 1969, Ellsberg arranged to have a copy transferred to his employer, the RAND Corporation, which did considerable consulting work for the Department of Defense. A former Marine and State Department

official who spent time in Vietnam, Ellsberg had become distressed by the conduct of the war. He hoped to use the papers to expose the government’s systematic pattern of both misleading the American public about the reasons the United States was in Vietnam and misrepresenting the success of military operations there. In October 1969, he began smuggling the papers from his office at RAND. With the help of Anthony Russo, a former RAND employee, Ellsberg made copies at the offices of a friend, public relations executive Lynda Sinay. Beginning in the fall of 1970, Ellsberg tried to enlist the support of sympathetic politicians in exposing information contained in the papers. When these efforts failed, he turned to the media.

In the spring of 1971, editors at the *New York Times* agreed to publish a series of articles based on the

documents, which became known as the Pentagon Papers. The first installment appeared on June 13, 1971, and the next two on June 14 and June 15. However, after the first article appeared, the U.S. Justice Department petitioned the U.S. District Court in New York for an injunction prohibiting further publications. The injunction was granted, and the *New York Times* suspended its series. Meanwhile, the *Washington Post*, *Boston Globe*, and *St. Louis Post-Dispatch* began publishing information from the documents. The Justice Department's request for an injunction against the *Washington Post* was not granted. The case was appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, and it moved quickly to the Supreme Court. On June 25, the justices agreed to hear oral arguments the next day. Because, on one hand, the Justice Department claimed that publication threatened national security and, on the other, the *New York Times* claimed that the injunction amounted to prior restraint (a violation of the First Amendment prohibiting interference with the freedom of the press), the Supreme Court took the extraordinary step of issuing a ruling within four days.

Author Biography

The decision in *New York Times Co. v. United States* was issued per curiam—from the court as a whole—and each justice wrote his own opinion explaining the rationale for his vote. The nine Supreme Court justices who issued the controversial ruling granting the *New York Times* the right to print the Pentagon Papers were a diverse group. Hugo Black (1886–1971) of Alabama, the longest serving member of the court, was appointed in 1937 by Franklin D. Roosevelt. William O. Douglas (1898–1980) of Minnesota was also appointed by Roosevelt, in 1939. William J. Brennan Jr. (1906–97) of New Jersey and Potter Stewart (1915–85) of Michigan were appointed by Dwight D. Eisenhower in 1956 and 1958, respectively. John F. Kennedy appointed Byron White (1917–2002) of Colorado in 1962. Lyndon B. Johnson appointed Thurgood Marshall (1908–93) of Maryland in 1967. Chief Justice Warren Burger (1907–95) of Minnesota was appointed by Richard M. Nixon in 1969, and John Marshall Harlan II (1899–71) of Illinois received his appointment a year later.



Historical Document

New York Times Co. v. United States

THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT

Decided June 30, 1971

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE SECOND CIRCUIT

403 U.S. 713

PER CURIAM

We granted certiorari in these cases in which the United States seeks to enjoin the *New York Times* and the *Washington Post* from publishing the contents of a classified study entitled “History of U.S. Decision-Making Process on Viet Nam Policy.”

“Any system of prior restraints of expression comes to this Court bearing a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity.” *Near v. Minnesota* (1931). The Government “thus carries a heavy burden of showing justification for the imposition of such a restraint.” The District Court for the Southern District of New York, in the *New York Times* case, and the District Court for the District of Columbia and the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, in the *Washington Post* case, held that the Government had not met that burden. We agree.

The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit is therefore affirmed. The order of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit is reversed, and the case is remanded with directions to enter a judgment affirming the judgment of the District Court for the Southern District of New York. The stays entered June 25, 1971, by the Court are vacated. The judgments shall issue forthwith.

So ordered.

MR. JUSTICE BLACK, with whom MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS joins,
concurring.

I adhere to the view that the Government’s case against the *Washington Post* should have been dismissed, and that the injunction against the *New York*

Times should have been vacated without oral argument when the cases were first presented to this Court. I believe that every moment's continuance of the injunctions against these newspapers amounts to a flagrant, indefensible, and continuing violation of the First Amendment. Furthermore, after oral argument, I agree completely that we must affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit and reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit for the reasons stated by my Brothers DOUGLAS and BRENNAN. In my view, it is unfortunate that some of my Brethren are apparently willing to hold that the publication of news may sometimes be enjoined. Such a holding would make a shambles of the First Amendment.

Our Government was launched in 1789 with the adoption of the Constitution. The Bill of Rights, including the First Amendment, followed in 1791. Now, for the first time in the 182 years since the founding of the Republic, the federal courts are asked to hold that the First Amendment does not mean what it says, but rather means that the Government can halt the publication of current news of vital importance to the people of this country.

In seeking injunctions against these newspapers, and in its presentation to the Court, the Executive Branch seems to have forgotten the essential purpose and history of the First Amendment....

In the First Amendment, the Founding Fathers gave the free press the protection it must have to fulfill its essential role in our democracy. The press was to serve the governed, not the governors. The Government's power to censor the press was abolished so that the press would remain forever free to censure the Government. The press was protected so that it could bare the secrets of government and inform the people. Only a free and unrestrained press can effectively expose deception in government. And paramount among the responsibilities of a free press is the duty to prevent any part of the government from deceiving the people and sending them off to distant lands to die of foreign fevers and foreign shot and shell. In my view, far from deserving condemnation for their courageous reporting, the *New York Times*, the *Washington Post*, and other newspapers should be commended for serving the purpose that the Founding Fathers saw so clearly. In revealing the workings of government that led to the Vietnam war, the newspapers nobly did precisely that which the Founders hoped and trusted they would do.

The Government's case here is based on premises entirely different from those that guided the Framers of the First Amendment. . . . We are asked to hold that, despite the First Amendment's emphatic command, the Executive Branch, the Congress, and the Judiciary can make laws enjoining publication of current news and abridging freedom of the press in the name of "national security." The Government does not even attempt to rely on any act of Congress. Instead, it makes the bold and dangerously far-reaching contention that

the courts should take it upon themselves to “make” a law abridging freedom of the press in the name of equity, presidential power and national security, even when the representatives of the people in Congress have adhered to the command of the First Amendment and refused to make such a law. To find that the President has “inherent power” to halt the publication of news by resort to the courts would wipe out the First Amendment and destroy the fundamental liberty and security of the very people the Government hopes to make “secure.” No one can read the history of the adoption of the First Amendment without being convinced beyond any doubt that it was injunctions like those sought here that Madison and his collaborators intended to outlaw in this Nation for all time. . . .

MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN, concurring.

I

I write separately in these cases only to emphasize what should be apparent: that our judgments in the present cases may not be taken to indicate the propriety, in the future, of issuing temporary stays and restraining orders to block the publication of material sought to be suppressed by the Government. So far as I can determine, never before has the United States sought to enjoin a newspaper from publishing information in its possession. The relative novelty of the questions presented, the necessary haste with which decisions were reached, the magnitude of the interests asserted, and the fact that all the parties have concentrated their arguments upon the question whether permanent restraints were proper may have justified at least some of the restraints heretofore imposed in these cases. Certainly it is difficult to fault the several courts below for seeking to assure that the issues here involved were preserved for ultimate review by this Court. But even if it be assumed that some of the interim restraints were proper in the two cases before us, that assumption has no bearing upon the propriety of similar judicial action in the future. To begin with, there has now been ample time for reflection and judgment; whatever values there may be in the preservation of novel questions for appellate review may not support any restraints in the future. More important, the First Amendment stands as an absolute bar to the imposition of judicial restraints in circumstances of the kind presented by these cases.

II

The error that has pervaded these cases from the outset was the granting of any injunctive relief whatsoever, interim or otherwise. The entire thrust of the Government’s claim throughout these cases has been that publication of the material sought to be enjoined “could,” or “might,” or “may” prejudice the national interest in various ways. But the First Amendment tolerates absolutely no prior judicial restraints of the press predicated upon surmise or conjecture that untoward consequences may result. Our cases, it is true, have indicated

that there is a single, extremely narrow class of cases in which the First Amendment's ban on prior judicial restraint may be overridden. Our cases have thus far indicated that such cases may arise only when the Nation "is at war," during which times "[n]o one would question but that a government might prevent actual obstruction to its recruiting service or the publication of the sailing dates of transports or the number and location of troops." *Near v. Minnesota* (1931).

Even if the present world situation were assumed to be tantamount to a time of war, or if the power of presently available armaments would justify even in peacetime the suppression of information that would set in motion a nuclear holocaust, in neither of these actions has the Government presented or even alleged that publication of items from or based upon the material at issue would cause the happening of an event of that nature. . . . And, therefore, every restraint issued in this case, whatever its form, has violated the First Amendment—and not less so because that restraint was justified as necessary to afford the courts an opportunity to examine the claim more thoroughly. Unless and until the Government has clearly made out its case, the First Amendment commands that no injunction may issue.

MR. JUSTICE STEWART, with whom MR. JUSTICE WHITE joins, concurring.

In the governmental structure created by our Constitution, the Executive is endowed with enormous power in the two related areas of national defense and international relations. This power, largely unchecked by the Legislative and Judicial branches, has been pressed to the very hilt since the advent of the nuclear missile age. For better or for worse, the simple fact is that a President of the United States possesses vastly greater constitutional independence in these two vital areas of power than does, say, a prime minister of a country with a parliamentary form of government.

In the absence of the governmental checks and balances present in other areas of our national life, the only effective restraint upon executive policy and power in the areas of national defense and international affairs may lie in an enlightened citizenry—in an informed and critical public opinion which alone can here protect the values of democratic government. For this reason, it is perhaps here that a press that is alert, aware, and free most vitally serves the basic purpose of the First Amendment. For, without an informed and free press, there cannot be an enlightened people.

Yet it is elementary that the successful conduct of international diplomacy and the maintenance of an effective national defense require both confidentiality and secrecy. Other nations can hardly deal with this Nation in an atmosphere of mutual trust unless they can be assured that their confidences will be kept. And, within our own executive departments, the development of

considered and intelligent international policies would be impossible if those charged with their formulation could not communicate with each other freely, frankly, and in confidence. In the area of basic national defense, the frequent need for absolute secrecy is, of course, self-evident.

I think there can be but one answer to this dilemma, if dilemma it be. The responsibility must be where the power is. If the Constitution gives the Executive a large degree of unshared power in the conduct of foreign affairs and the maintenance of our national defense, then, under the Constitution, the Executive must have the largely unshared duty to determine and preserve the degree of internal security necessary to exercise that power successfully. It is an awesome responsibility, requiring judgment and wisdom of a high order. I should suppose that moral, political, and practical considerations would dictate that a very first principle of that wisdom would be an insistence upon avoiding secrecy for its own sake. For when everything is classified, then nothing is classified, and the system becomes one to be disregarded by the cynical or the careless, and to be manipulated by those intent on self-protection or self-promotion. I should suppose, in short, that the hallmark of a truly effective internal security system would be the maximum possible disclosure, recognizing that secrecy can best be preserved only when credibility is truly maintained. But, be that as it may, it is clear to me that it is the constitutional duty of the Executive—as a matter of sovereign prerogative, and not as a matter of law as the courts know law—through the promulgation and enforcement of executive regulations, to protect the confidentiality necessary to carry out its responsibilities in the fields of international relations and national defense.

This is not to say that Congress and the courts have no role to play. Undoubtedly, Congress has the power to enact specific and appropriate criminal laws to protect government property and preserve government secrets. Congress has passed such laws, and several of them are of very colorable relevance to the apparent circumstances of these cases. And if a criminal prosecution is instituted, it will be the responsibility of the courts to decide the applicability of the criminal law under which the charge is brought. Moreover, if Congress should pass a specific law authorizing civil proceedings in this field, the courts would likewise have the duty to decide the constitutionality of such a law, as well as its applicability to the facts proved.

But in the cases before us, we are asked neither to construe specific regulations nor to apply specific laws. We are asked, instead, to perform a function that the Constitution gave to the Executive, not the Judiciary. We are asked, quite simply, to prevent the publication by two newspapers of material that the Executive Branch insists should not, in the national interest, be published. I am convinced that the Executive is correct with respect to some of the documents involved. But I cannot say that disclosure of any of them will surely result in direct, immediate, and irreparable damage to our Nation or its

people. That being so, there can under the First Amendment be but one judicial resolution of the issues before us. I join the judgments of the Court.

MR. JUSTICE WHITE, with whom MR. JUSTICE STEWART joins, concurring.

I concur in today's judgments, but only because of the concededly extraordinary protection against prior restraints enjoyed by the press under our constitutional system. I do not say that in no circumstances would the First Amendment permit an injunction against publishing information about government plans or operations. Nor, after examining the materials the Government characterizes as the most sensitive and destructive, can I deny that revelation of these documents will do substantial damage to public interests. Indeed, I am confident that their disclosure will have that result. But I nevertheless agree that the United States has not satisfied the very heavy burden that it must meet to warrant an injunction against publication in these cases, at least in the absence of express and appropriately limited congressional authorization for prior restraints in circumstances such as these. . . .

MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL, concurring.

The Government contends that the only issue in these cases is whether, in a suit by the United States, "the First Amendment bars a court from prohibiting a newspaper from publishing material whose disclosure would pose a 'grave and immediate danger to the security of the United States.'" With all due respect, I believe the ultimate issue in these cases is even more basic than the one posed by the Solicitor General. The issue is whether this Court or the Congress has the power to make law.

In these cases, there is no problem concerning the President's power to classify information as "secret" or "top secret." Congress has specifically recognized Presidential authority to classify documents and information. Nor is there any issue here regarding the President's power as Chief Executive and Commander in Chief to protect national security by disciplining employees who disclose information and by taking precautions to prevent leaks.

The problem here is whether, in these particular cases, the Executive Branch has authority to invoke the equity jurisdiction of the courts to protect what it believes to be the national interest. The Government argues that, in addition to the inherent power of any government to protect itself, the President's power to conduct foreign affairs and his position as Commander in Chief give him authority to impose censorship on the press to protect his ability to deal effectively with foreign nations and to conduct the military affairs of the country. . . .

It would, however, be utterly inconsistent with the concept of separation of powers for this Court to use its power of contempt to prevent behavior that Congress has specifically declined to prohibit. There would be a similar damage to the basic concept of these co-equal branches of Government if, when the Executive Branch has adequate authority granted by Congress to protect “national security,” it can choose, instead, to invoke the contempt power of a court to enjoin the threatened conduct. The Constitution provides that Congress shall make laws, the President execute laws, and courts interpret laws. It may be more convenient for the Executive Branch if it need only convince a judge to prohibit conduct, rather than ask the Congress to pass a law, and it may be more convenient to enforce a contempt order than to seek a criminal conviction in a jury trial. Moreover, it may be considered politically wise to get a court to share the responsibility for arresting those who the Executive Branch has probable cause to believe are violating the law. But convenience and political considerations of the moment do not justify a basic departure from the principles of our system of government.

In these cases, we are not faced with a situation where Congress has failed to provide the Executive with broad power to protect the Nation from disclosure of damaging state secrets. Congress has, on several occasions, given extensive consideration to the problem of protecting the military and strategic secrets of the United States. This consideration has resulted in the enactment of statutes making it a crime to receive, disclose, communicate, withhold, and publish certain documents, photographs, instruments, appliances, and information. . . .

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER, dissenting.

So clear are the constitutional limitations on prior restraint against expression that, from the time of *Near v. Minnesota* we have had little occasion to be concerned with cases involving prior restraints against news reporting on matters of public interest. There is, therefore, little variation among the members of the Court in terms of resistance to prior restraints against publication. Adherence to this basic constitutional principle, however, does not make these cases simple. In these cases, the imperative of a free and unfettered press comes into collision with another imperative, the effective functioning of a complex modern government, and, specifically, the effective exercise of certain constitutional powers of the Executive. Only those who view the First Amendment as an absolute in all circumstances—a view I respect, but reject—can find such cases as these to be simple or easy.

These cases are not simple for another and more immediate reason. We do not know the facts of the cases. No District Judge knew all the facts. No Court of Appeals judge knew all the facts. No member of this Court knows all the facts.

Why are we in this posture, in which only those judges to whom the First Amendment is absolute and permits of no restraint in any circumstances or for any reason, are really in a position to act?

I suggest we are in this posture because these cases have been conducted in unseemly haste. MR. JUSTICE HARLAN covers the chronology of events demonstrating the hectic pressures under which these cases have been processed, and I need not restate them. The prompt setting of these cases reflects our universal abhorrence of prior restraint. But prompt judicial action does not mean unjudicial haste.

Here, moreover, the frenetic haste is due in large part to the manner in which the *Times* proceeded from the date it obtained the purloined documents. It seems reasonably clear now that the haste precluded reasonable and deliberate judicial treatment of these cases, and was not warranted. The precipitate action of this Court aborting trials not yet completed is not the kind of judicial conduct that ought to attend the disposition of a great issue.

The newspapers make a derivative claim under the First Amendment; they denominate this right as the public “right to know”; by implication, the *Times* asserts a sole trusteeship of that right by virtue of its journalistic “scoop.” The right is asserted as an absolute. Of course, the First Amendment right itself is not an absolute, as Justice Holmes so long ago pointed out in his aphorism concerning the right to shout “fire” in a crowded theater if there was no fire. There are other exceptions, some of which Chief Justice Hughes mentioned by way of example in *Near v. Minnesota*. There are no doubt other exceptions no one has had occasion to describe or discuss. Conceivably, such exceptions may be lurking in these cases and, would have been flushed had they been properly considered in the trial courts, free from unwarranted deadlines and frenetic pressures. An issue of this importance should be tried and heard in a judicial atmosphere conducive to thoughtful, reflective deliberation, especially when haste, in terms of hours, is unwarranted in light of the long period the *Times*, by its own choice, deferred publication.

It is not disputed that the *Times* has had unauthorized possession of the documents for three to four months, during which it has had its expert analysts studying them, presumably digesting them and preparing the material for publication. During all of this time, the *Times*, presumably in its capacity as trustee of the public’s “right to know,” has held up publication for purposes it considered proper, and thus public knowledge was delayed. No doubt this was for a good reason; the analysis of 7,000 pages of complex material drawn from a vastly greater volume of material would inevitably take time, and the writing of good news stories takes time. But why should the United States Government, from whom this information was illegally acquired by someone, along with all the counsel, trial judges, and appellate judges be placed under needless pressure? After these months of deferral, the alleged “right

to know” has somehow and suddenly become a right that must be vindicated instantaneously.

Would it have been unreasonable, since the newspaper could anticipate the Government’s objections to release of secret material, to give the Government an opportunity to review the entire collection and determine whether agreement could be reached on publication? Stolen or not, if security was not, in fact, jeopardized, much of the material could no doubt have been declassified, since it spans a period ending in 1968. With such an approach—one that great newspapers have in the past practiced and stated editorially to be the duty of an honorable press—the newspapers and Government might well have narrowed the area of disagreement as to what was and was not publishable, leaving the remainder to be resolved in orderly litigation, if necessary. To me, it is hardly believable that a newspaper long regarded as a great institution in American life would fail to perform one of the basic and simple duties of every citizen with respect to the discovery or possession of stolen property or secret government documents. That duty, I had thought—perhaps naively—was to report forthwith, to responsible public officers. This duty rests on taxi drivers, Justices, and the *New York Times*. The course followed by the *Times*, whether so calculated or not, removed any possibility of orderly litigation of the issue. If the action of the judges up to now has been correct, that result is sheer happenstance.

Our grant of the writ of certiorari before final judgment in the *Times* case aborted the trial in the District Court before it had made a complete record pursuant to the mandate of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.

The consequence of all this melancholy series of events is that we literally do not know what we are acting on. As I see it, we have been forced to deal with litigation concerning rights of great magnitude without an adequate record, and surely without time for adequate treatment either in the prior proceedings or in this Court. It is interesting to note that counsel on both sides, in oral argument before this Court, were frequently unable to respond to questions on factual points. Not surprisingly, they pointed out that they had been working literally “around the clock,” and simply were unable to review the documents that give rise to these cases and were not familiar with them. This Court is in no better posture. I agree generally with MR. JUSTICE HARLAN and MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN, but I am not prepared to reach the merits.
...

We all crave speedier judicial processes, but, when judges are pressured, as in these cases, the result is a parody of the judicial function.

MR. JUSTICE HARLAN, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE and MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN join, dissenting.

These cases forcefully call to mind the wise admonition of Mr. Justice Holmes, dissenting in *Northern Securities Co. v. United States*, 193 U.S. 197, 400-401 (1904):

“Great cases, like hard cases, make bad law. For great cases are called great not by reason of their real importance in shaping the law of the future, but because of some accident of immediate overwhelming interest which appeals to the feelings and distorts the judgment. These immediate interests exercise a kind of hydraulic pressure which makes what previously was clear seem doubtful, and before which even well settled principles of law will bend.”

With all respect, I consider that the Court has been almost irresponsibly feverish in dealing with these cases. . . .

This frenzied train of events took place in the name of the presumption against prior restraints created by the First Amendment. Due regard for the extraordinarily important and difficult questions involved in these litigations should have led the Court to shun such a precipitate timetable. In order to decide the merits of these cases properly, some or all of the following questions should have been faced:

1. Whether the Attorney General is authorized to bring these suits in the name of the United States.
2. Whether the First Amendment permits the federal courts to enjoin publication of stories which would present a serious threat to national security.
3. Whether the threat to publish highly secret documents is of itself a sufficient implication of national security to justify an injunction on the theory that, regardless of the contents of the documents, harm enough results simply from the demonstration of such a breach of secrecy.
4. Whether the unauthorized disclosure of any of these particular documents would seriously impair the national security.
5. What weight should be given to the opinion of high officers in the Executive Branch of the Government with respect to questions 3 and 4.
6. Whether the newspapers are entitled to retain and use the documents notwithstanding the seemingly uncontested facts that the documents, or the originals of which they are duplicates, were purloined from the Government's possession, and that the newspapers received them with knowledge that they had been feloniously acquired.

7. Whether the threatened harm to the national security or the Government's possessory interest in the documents justifies the issuance of an injunction against publication in light of—

- a. The strong First Amendment policy against prior restraints on publication;
- b. The doctrine against enjoining conduct in violation of criminal statutes; and
- c. The extent to which the materials at issue have apparently already been otherwise disseminated.

These are difficult questions of fact, of law, and of judgment; the potential consequences of erroneous decision are enormous. The time which has been available to us, to the lower courts, and to the parties has been wholly inadequate for giving these cases the kind of consideration they deserve. It is a reflection on the stability of the judicial process that these great issues—as important as any that have arisen during my time on the Court—should have been decided under the pressures engendered by the torrent of publicity that has attended these litigations from their inception.

Forced as I am to reach the merits of these cases, I dissent from the opinion and judgments of the Court. Within the severe limitations imposed by the time constraints under which I have been required to operate, I can only state my reasons in telescoped form, even though, in different circumstances, I would have felt constrained to deal with the cases in the fuller sweep indicated above.

It is a sufficient basis for affirming the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in the Times litigation to observe that its order must rest on the conclusion that, because of the time elements the Government had not been given an adequate opportunity to present its case to the District Court. At the least this conclusion was not an abuse of discretion. . . .

It is plain to me that the scope of the judicial function in passing upon the activities of the Executive Branch of the Government in the field of foreign affairs is very narrowly restricted. This view is, I think, dictated by the concept of separation of powers upon which our constitutional system rests.

In a speech on the floor of the House of Representatives, Chief Justice John Marshall, then a member of that body, stated: "The President is the sole organ of the nation in its external relations, and its sole representative with foreign nations."

From that time, shortly after the founding of the Nation, to this, there has been no substantial challenge to this description of the scope of executive power.

From this constitutional primacy in the field of foreign affairs, it seems to me that certain conclusions necessarily follow. Some of these were stated concisely by President Washington, declining the request of the House of Representatives for the papers leading up to the negotiation of the Jay Treaty:

“The nature of foreign negotiations requires caution, and their success must often depend on secrecy; and even when brought to a conclusion, a full disclosure of all the measures, demands, or eventual concessions which may have been proposed or contemplated would be extremely impolitic; for this might have a pernicious influence on future negotiations, or produce immediate inconveniences, perhaps danger and mischief, in relation to other powers.”

The power to evaluate the “pernicious influence” of premature disclosure is not, however, lodged in the Executive alone. I agree that, in performance of its duty to protect the values of the First Amendment against political pressures, the judiciary must review the initial Executive determination to the point of satisfying itself that the subject matter of the dispute does lie within the proper compass of the President’s foreign relations power. Constitutional considerations forbid “a complete abandonment of judicial control.” This safeguard is required in the analogous area of executive claims of privilege for secrets of state.

But, in my judgment, the judiciary may not properly go beyond these two inquiries and redetermine for itself the probable impact of disclosure on the national security.

“[T]he very nature of executive decisions as to foreign policy is political, not judicial. Such decisions are wholly confided by our Constitution to the political departments of the government, Executive and Legislative. They are delicate, complex, and involve large elements of prophecy. They are and should be undertaken only by those directly responsible to the people whose welfare they advance or imperil. They are decisions of a kind for which the Judiciary has neither aptitude, facilities nor responsibility, and which has long been held to belong in the domain of political power not subject to judicial intrusion or inquiry.”

Even if there is some room for the judiciary to override the executive determination, it is plain that the scope of review must be exceedingly narrow. I can see no indication in the opinions of either the District Court or the Court of Appeals in the Post litigation that the conclusions of the Executive were given

even the deference owing to an administrative agency, much less that owing to a co-equal branch of the Government operating within the field of its constitutional prerogative. . . .

MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN, dissenting.

I join MR. JUSTICE HARLAN in his dissent. I also am in substantial accord with much that MR. JUSTICE WHITE says, by way of admonition, in the latter part of his opinion. . . .



Document Analysis

The Supreme Court's decision in *New York Times Co. v. United States* addresses an important constitutional dilemma: Is the press entitled to unfettered freedom to print information about government activities, or are there occasions when prior restraint may be imposed, particularly if national security is involved? As the per curiam decision notes, the court presumes the burden is on the government to show why prior restraint is required.

The individual opinions accompanying the court's judgment—six concurring opinions and three dissents—reflect a wide range of reasons for the justices' decisions. As might be expected, all employ legal terminology and cite precedents (earlier cases dealing with similar matters). However, justices on both sides use pointed and, on occasion, alarmist language to make their arguments regarding the right of the *New York Times* to publish materials obtained illegally but containing information of interest to the public. Additionally, the justices' direct personal commentary reveals how seriously they took their responsibilities in deliberating this history-making case.

The six justices who voted to strike down lower-court rulings share the view that prior restraint in this case is not warranted. Justice Hugo Black, however, uses an unusual degree of emotional language to argue that prior restraint is never permissible. He calls the injunction imposed by the lower courts “flagrant, [and] indefensible,” and describes any attempt to restrain publication as “mak[ing] a shambles of the First Amendment.” Others in the majority take less dogmatic stances. Justice Douglas believes the government's claim that national security would be damaged by publication is a smokescreen to hide the real issue: government embarrassment. The purpose of the First Amendment, Douglas argues, is to protect the press from government interference in disseminating embarrassing materials; in a personal observation, he suggests that this case “will, I think, go down in history as the most dramatic illustration of that principle.” The other justices voting with the majority offer additional reasons for their votes. Justices Brennan and Stewart, for example, assert that the government simply has not proven its case. Stewart

goes on to question the government's classification system.

The three justices who sided with the government all agreed that the First Amendment protects the media's right to publish without prior restraint. But all three argue that this right is not absolute and must be balanced with other provisions of the Constitution. As Justice Blackmun insists, “I cannot subscribe to a doctrine of unlimited absolutism for the First Amendment at the cost of downgrading other provisions” of the Constitution. The dissenters argued further that the court was being rushed into a decision, and that the magnitude of the case warranted further deliberation.

In an ingenious twist on the notion of prior restraint, Chief Justice Burger points out in his dissent that the *New York Times* has validated the principle by holding up publication for several months to examine the materials Ellsberg had given it. Yet the newspaper is insisting that the court be rushed to judgment in the matter. Burger's frustration is evident in his statement, “The consequence of all this melancholy series of events is that we literally do not know what we are acting on.” Justice Harlan echoes this point, calling the court's actions “almost irresponsibly feverish,” and argues that he and his colleagues should give “due regard” for “the extraordinarily important and difficult questions” before them by opting to “shun such a precipitate timetable.”

Essential Themes

The immediate impact of the justices' decision in the Pentagon Papers case was to allow newspapers to continue publishing information that exposed the government's political misjudgments and military miscalculations, as well as its systematic pattern of sanitizing information before releasing it to the public to avoid embarrassment. The *New York Times* series ran until July 5, 1971. The publication of the Pentagon Papers caused American support for the Vietnam War to deteriorate further, putting increased pressure on the Nixon administration to end hostilities and to withdraw American troops from the region.

The justices' ruling did not address the issue of whether Ellsberg's and Russo's activities in obtaining

and releasing the Pentagon Papers were legal. Because the federal government was not barred from initiating criminal charges against those who obtained and copied the papers illegally, on December 30, 1971, the Justice Department filed charges against Ellsberg and Russo for theft of government property and unauthorized possession of classified documents. Lengthy pretrial wrangling kept the cases from going to court until 1973, and before any trial was completed, charges were dismissed. Central to the latter outcome were actions authorized by Nixon to have Ellsberg's psychiatrist's offices broken into to look for dirt on the former Pentagon researcher. The break-in was discovered, leading to the dismissal of charges. The same operatives who conducted the break in were later caught up in the Watergate Affair.

The third major outcome of the Supreme Court's decision, and the one with the most lasting impact, was the reaffirmation of the right of the press to publish without prior restraint. While the court did not declare freedom of the press an uninhibited right, by ruling in favor of the *New York Times* in the Pentagon

Papers case, the justices placed the obligation in future cases on the government to show cause in asserting its claims that national security would be damaged irreparably by publication of classified information.

—Laurence W. Mazzeno, PhD

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